Partial Industry Regulation: A Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection by Ayres, Ian & Brathwaite, John
Partial-Industry Regulation:
A Monopsony Standard for
Consumer Protection
Ian Ayrest and John Braithwaitet
Regulations usually apply to all members of an industry. Professors
Ayres and Braithwaite propose that in some situations 'partial industry"
regulation is superior to all-or-nothing regulatory policies. Partial-industry
regulation governs only a part of an industry, leaving other parts either
unregulated or disparately regulated. Regulating only an individual firm
(or subset offirms) can engender a system of checks and balances in which
the regulated and unregulated portions of the market each curb the
excesses of the alternative form of market governance. Partial-industry
regulation can thus promote efficiency by restraining monopoly power
without giving rise to the evils of either captured or benighted regulation.
The authors' theories ofpartial-industry intervention gain support from an
analysis of monopsonist behavior. Governments interested in promoting
consumer welfare should often emulate what a monopsonist consumer
would do. One way to reconceive of the regulator's decision whether to
subsidize fringe competition is to ask if a hypothetical downstream monop-
sonist would subsidize upstream entry to 'second-source" the product. A
monopsony standard provides not only a powerful tool for analyzing how
government might intervene to protect consumers, but also a limiting prin-
ciple for analyzing when intervention is appropriate.
INTRODUCTION
Federal and state regulation of the United States economy often dis-
plays an all-or-nothing character: regulations govern either all members
of an industry or none. A host of federal agencies pervasively regulate
the conduct of entire industries. For example, the Securities and
Exchange Commission regulates the securities industry, the Food and
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Drug Administration regulates the production of pharmaceuticals, and
the Federal Reserve regulates the banking industry. In addition, many
regulations promulgated under federal statutes, such as the Clean Air
Act, mandate or prescribe certain dimensions of industry behavior. Even
among industries that are not extensively regulated, those regulations
that do exist tend to apply to all industry members or none.
Not surprisingly, the academic and political discussion of regulation
mirrors this dichotomous reality. The deregulation debate often implic-
itly considers only two regulatory alternatives: government must either
impose industry-wide regulations or allow unconstrained markets to
determine the allocation of scarce resources. The regulatory literature
has identified significant costs associated with each alternative. Laissez-
faire policies that leave monopoly or oligopoly power unchecked in pri-
vate hands might allow industry members to raise their prices above the
competitive level.' But industry-wide regulation might have the same
effect: regulators can be "captured" by the very firms they attempt to
regulate.' Captured regulators can organize a cartel among producers in
an industry and legally mandate that these firms sell at an inflated price.
For those who fear these costs of capture, the only thing worse than
letting market power coalesce in private hands is giving a corrupt
Leviathan the power to define the parameters of market transactions.
Even uncaptured regulators face significant informational hurdles in
promulgating efficient regulations. Regulatory agencies may have great
difficulty ascertaining the proper "competitive" price because production
costs are not observable. If the agency guesses too low, firms will not
recoup their costs; if the agency guesses too high, consumers again will
be forced to buy at cartel-like prices.
This Article explores a middle path between the Scylla of full indus-
try regulation and the Charybdis of laissez-faire policies. We propose
that in some situations "partial-industry" regulation may be superior to
all-or-nothing regulatory policies. In its broadest sense a regime of par-
tial-industry regulation would allow a government to regulate only part
of an industry, leaving the rest unregulated.3 Under partial-industry reg-
1. See JoE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 25-36 (1959) (discussing pricing theory and
effects of seller concentration on firm conduct and performance).
2. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983) (presenting a theory of competition among pressure groups for
political influence); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211 (1976) (elaborating on the theory that returns from group capture of regulators diminish as
group size increases); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. 3, 10-12 (1971) (discussing industry ability to employ political machinery to their own ends).
3. Thus, a broad reading of partial-industry regulation would encompass regulatory regimes
that disparately affect members within the same industry. Such a situation exists in the United
States both in the securities industry, in that equivalent securities face differential regulation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and in the
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ulatory schemes, government purposefully treats firms in an industry
differently.4
In some regulatory settings, regulating only an individual firm (or a
subset of the firms) in an industry can promote efficiency by restraining
monopoly power without giving rise to the evils of either captured or
benighted regulation. Especially in a dynamic or evolutionary sense, par-
tial-industry regulation might be more resilient to private and public
abuses of market power. Our theory derives its strength from both
camps of the regulation/deregulation debate. Like advocates of regula-
tion, we accept that unregulated markets sometimes fail to produce com-
petitive prices. But like advocates of deregulation, we also acknowledge
that unregulated competitors have strong incentives to chisel away at
cartel agreements and thereby destabilize collusion. Unlike full-industry
regulation, which extinguishes many benefits of interfirm competition,5
partial-industry regulatory strategies try to harness and foster the wel-
fare-enhancing effects of competition.
Partial-industry regulation begins with the premise that the exist-
ence of a single or a few competitive firms can dramatically affect the
competitive conduct and performance of an entire industry. The central
insight of partial-industry regulation is that government can accomplish
many regulatory goals by maintaining the competitive performance of a
subset of the firms in an industry. Far from denying the powerful effect
of competition, partial-industry regulation uses the regulated firms to
affect the behavior of other firms in the market. Unlike across-the-board
industry regulation, however, mistaken or captured government deci-
dairy market, in which regulation sets different minimum prices for milk producers in different
states. Different levels of judicial or agency scrutiny, including disparate efforts to detect
noncompliance, would also create a partial-industry regulatory dynamic in that some firms would
effectively be less regulated.
Partial-industry regulation could be especially important in international markets, in which this
idea intersects with the current "industrial policy" debate--concerning whether and how to promote
domestic industries. In international markets many foreign competitors are beyond the reach of an
individual government's fiat, so partial-industry regulation could in effect be the only regulatory
alternative. As discussed below, see infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text, the partial-industry
goal of assuring second sources of supply could be especially important to consumers in general. But
in the international context individual states are likely to prefer expanding their local production
over the improvement of global social welfare.
4. Most of the regulations discussed in this Article will be "immutable" in the sense that
affected firms will not have the option of contracting around them. See generally Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules 99
YALE L.J. 87, 87-91 (1989) (providing an overview of immutable rules). There will be settings in
which unregulated firms will be able to opt into the regulations, however, such as by contractually
committing to sell at the regulated price.
5. For example, when the United States Civil Aeronautics Board set airline fares, airlines by
law could not compete over price, and were left to compete on such nonprice dimensions of airline
service as nonstop flights and on-time performance. The result benefitted neither the airlines nor
consumers. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 204 (2d ed. 1977).
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sions do not necessarily adversely affect the unregulated firms. Instead of
completely displacing the market, partial-industry regulation maintains a
structure of "checks and balances" between the two extremes of
regulation.
Partial-industry regulation can be seen as a form of regulatory dele-
gation.6 The regulated firms in the industry indirectly bear the burden of
assuring that the unregulated firms comply. The compliance of unregu-
lated firms is assured because competition forces them to match the offers
of the regulated firm. Therefore, unlike other strategies of delegation, the
regulated firms do not need to appreciate their disciplining function.
A major thesis of this Article is that government should adopt a
"monopsony standard" for consumer protection interventions. Under
this standard, government should only intervene on consumers' behalf to
improve the workings of a market in situations where a monopsonist
buyer7 would rationally intervene on its own behalf. The monopsony
standard provides strong indications of when and how government
should intervene. Monopsonists represent the quintessentially empow-
ered consumer. By studying how these consumers with market power
protect themselves, government can better target and tailor interventions
on behalf of less powerful consumers. We argue that a monopsony stan-
dard provides particularly strong evidence supporting the use of partial-
industry regulation because monopsonists often undertake their own pri-
vate analogues to partial-industry interventions.'
A monopsony standard for consumer protection is also attractive
because it provides a limiting principle indicating when government
should intervene. As discussed below,9 the private practice of second-
sourcing-subsidizing second sources of supply-shows that treating
sellers differently can indeed be rational in individual cases, and provides
6. In a separate work we place partial-industry regulation in a broader framework of
regulatory delegation. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (forthcoming 1992). In that book we also discuss
how regulatory enforcement might also be delegated to third parties ("tripartism") or to the
regulated firms themselves ("enforced self-regulation"). For a brief discussion of tripartite
interventionism, see the Conclusion of this Article.
7. In a market in which there is a single buyer, that buyer is defined as a monopsonist.
8. This monopsony standard could be used to inform other aspects of consumer protection.
For example, the tendency of monopsonists to require sellers to disclose their markup provides
strong evidence that markup disclosure might promote the welfare of more diffuse groups of
consumers. See Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, "I'll Sell It To You At Cost" Legal Methods to
Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 1047, 1057 (1990) (noting that some
monopsonists bargain for markup disclosure). The tendency of multiple-car buyers to negotiate
fixed prices provides evidence that intervention to reduce price dispersion might promote consumer
welfare. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REv. 817, 868-71 (1991) (discussing reform strategies of prohibiting high markup
sales, restricting price dispersion, and mandating disclosure of markups to protect consumers).
9. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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government with guidelines for distinguishing situations in which gov-
ernment-sanctioned disparate treatment is likely to be rational from situ-
ations in which it is not. The monopsony standard thus provides a
powerful source of necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for interven-
tion. Even when a monopsonist would intervene, the particular costs of
government intervention might preclude the use of partial-industry regu-
lation. Thus, the monopsony standard more concretely provides a limit-
ing principle to government actions, suggesting that if a monopsonist
would not intervene to change a market outcome, government should not
either.
From the prevailing all-or-nothing regulatory mind-set, many forms
of partial-industry regulation might seem radical. This Article provides
a theoretical justification for further exploration of partial-industry regu-
lation, bolstering its thesis with examples of successful private and public
interventions that disparately regulate the sellers in particular markets.
For the most part we argue for government regulatory attempts that pro-
mote competitive pricing in industries. But our larger argument is that
partial-industry regulation can be a useful policy tool to correct other
types of market failure as well. 10 Government intervention directed at a
subset of firms in an industry, for example, can spur the development of
additional safety precautions, innovation, or information without com-
pletely forgoing the checks and balances of private competition.
Our argument is not that partial-industry regulation is costless or
that it should be pursued on an economy-wide basis. For one thing, par-
tial-industry regulation raises constitutional issues of equal protection
that are analyzed below." Additionally, as we make clear, there are sig-
nificant costs to partial-industry regulation that will clearly preclude its
use in several regulatory contexts. But to be viable, partial-industry reg-
ulation must only succeed in doing better than the all-or-nothing alterna-
tives. In some circumstances, we prefer the rifle to either the shotgun or
no gun at all.
We begin by setting out both a theoretical and practical typology of
partial-industry regulation. By analyzing both the costs and benefits of
such intervention, we show that government could use a diverse range of
possible partial-industry interventions to promote competition. We next
discuss the monopsony standard as a guide for government intervention
strategy. Potential equal protection problems resulting from disparate
treatment of firms within the same industry are then analyzed. We end
10. However, we later explicitly discuss situations in which partial-industry regulation might
not be appropriate. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. In particular, when market failure
injures people who are not in privity with the industry, such as with pollution, then competition
between regulated and unregulated firms will not engender general industry compliance.
11. See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
1992]
HeinOnline -- 80 Cal. L. Rev. 17 1992
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
by discussing a series of applications-industry studies of oil, passenger
airline service, news media, and long-distance telephone service-in




A. A Typology of Partial-Industry Regulation
Although partial-industry intervention can take numerous forms,
one can analytically distinguish among interventions that are directed at
three different types of firms: dominant firms, fringe firms, and oligopoly
firms. For purposes of our analysis it is useful to divide the regulations
according to the type of firms at which they are targeted because the
goals and forms of partial-industry interventions will vary depending on
the types of firms addressed.
Many industries are characterized by a pronounced dichotomy
between dominant and fringe firms. "Dominant firms" are larger and
seem to take the lead in setting price and other competitive variables,
while the smaller "fringe firms" are followers, more passively matching
the competitive decisions of the dominant firms. The most important
decision of the competitive fringe often is, given the prevailing market
price, to decide how much to produce.12 Other markets are more easily
characterized as "oligopolies" in which a small number of firms of rela-
tively equal size compete on such variables as price and quantity in a
much more interdependent and strategic fashion. Oligopolistic indus-
tries have no clear followers or leaders; rather, it is through the iterated
history of firm interaction that a market equilibrium is fashioned."
1. Dominant-Firm Intervention
Regulatory policies directed only at the dominant firm in an indus-
try will often be similar to traditional forms of industry-wide regulation.
Dominant-firm intervention will generally attempt to constrain the larg-
est firm (or firms) in the industry from exercising market power to the
detriment of consumers. In its simplest form, dominant-firm interven-
tion could pursue this goal by establishing the price at which the domi-
nant firm must sell its product.
12. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
232 (1970).
13. These market classifications do not, of course, reflect the prevailing organization of all
markets. Some markets that consist of numerous small competitors comport more with our notions
of perfect competition.
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a. Potential Advantages Over Laissez-Faire Governance
Dominant-firm regulation vis-a'-vis no regulation can benefit con-
sumers in two ways. First, like industry-wide intervention, setting a
maximum price for a dominant firm can restrict the degree of market
power it would wield in an otherwise unregulated market. An unregu-
lated dominant firm would have incentives to raise its price above its
cost. This is especially true where fringe firms have only limited produc-
tion capacities, and therefore consumers are forced to look to the domi-
nant firm to fulfill demand.' 4 On the other hand, when dominant-firm
prices are regulated, fringe firms will have difficulty maintaining sales if
they raise their prices above the restrained price of a dominant firm. By
setting the dominant firm's maximum price, a regulatory agency can
effectively set an entire industry's maximum price. Thus, regulating a
dominant firm can benefit consumers directly by lowering the dominant
firm's price and indirectly by lowering the prices of its competitors.
Second, regulations that set a short-term minimum price for domi-
nant firms might facilitate the entry of additional competition into the
market and ultimately benefit consumers. Even though a binding mini-
mum-price restriction in the short run might prevent consumers from
enjoying the benefit of lower prices on the dominant firm's goods, this
price restraint can actually facilitate competitive entry that ultimately
inures to consumers' benefit. New firms might be deterred from entering
the industry by the fear that entrenched firms will respond by reducing
prices to make any entry unprofitable. By prohibiting these initial price
decreases, limited-time minimum-price standards may induce entry, ulti-
mately increasing competition after the price floors are removed.
One extreme form of post-entry attack that a dominant firm can use
against entrants is predatory pricing. The established firm in such a
scheme sets its prices below its production costs in order to drive out
fringe competition and then raises its prices to monopoly levels.15 How-
14. Fringe firms in such situations tend to follow a dominant firm's price increase. For
example, David Haddock presented a basing-point pricing scheme that illustrated such dominant/
fringe-firm interaction. Under this pricing strategy, the price that all customers paid for a good
included a transportation price "as if" the good were shipped from a certain basing point. For
example, under the "Pittsburgh-plus" steel system, the price of steel for Chicago purchasers would
be calculated as if the steel had been shipped from faraway Pittsburgh even when it was sent from
nearby Gary, Indiana. Haddock demonstrated that because Pittsburgh manufacturers were
dominant suppliers, steel firms in Gary had natural incentives to match delivered prices from
Pittsburgh. David D. Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive vs. Collusive Theories, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 289, 290-91 (1982).
15. There is currently a lively debate about whether such predation could ever be a profitable
strategy for dominant firms. See, eg., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 588-91 (1986) (discussing uncertain success of predatory-pricing conspiracies); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1984) (illustrating difficulty of
recouping profits lost under predatory pricing); Eric Rasmusen, Naked Exclusion (1990)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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ever, firms need not follow such extreme pricing strategies because even
nonpredatory price cuts can deter beneficial entry. Consider, for exam-
ple, an industry in which a dominant firm without competition sets its
price above its marginal cost. Because of a "learning curve" effect, new
entrants might initially have higher costs but would eventually incur the
same production costs as the dominant firm. Thus, a dominant firm may
be able to deter entry by threatening to drop its price just slightly below a
new entrant's cost. Because the dominant firm would have an initial cost
advantage, this price reduction need not be predatory in the sense that
the product's price would still be above production cost. But the price
reduction would mean that a new entrant would not be able to recoup
any of its start-up costs, and would therefore be deterred from entering
the market.
By restraining the ability of dominant firms to respond immediately
to entry with price cuts, minimum-price regulation could ensure nascent
entrants limited protection from aggressive pricing by the incumbent
firm.16 If minimum-price regulations were then relaxed, the new
entrants could compete on an equal footing and consumers could benefit
from competition-induced lower prices.17 Thus, dominant-firm regula-
tion may be superior to laissez-faire policies because it can promote com-
petitive price levels in two ways: it can restrain supracompetitive pricing
by all the firms in an industry, and it can facilitate entry by temporarily
limiting dominant-firm price cuts aimed at deterring such entry.
b. Potential Advantages Over Industry- Wide Regulation
Dominant-firm regulation may also be superior to industry-wide
regulation because it preserves the independence of fringe firms as a com-
petitive check on the decisions of regulatory agencies. Although fringe
firms will rarely have incentives to price above a dominant firm,18 they
may have strong incentives to undercut dominant-firm prices to gain
market share. By maintaining this potential for fringe-firm price cutting,
dominant-firm intervention may engender more competition than indus-
try-wide intervention.
Industry-wide regulation allows the coercive power of the state to
16. As discussed infra text accompanying note 80, however, this restriction on a firm's ability
to lower prices can be exploited by firms that control or capture the government's use of price
regulation, thereby placing their rivals at a competitive disadvantage by forcing them to charge more
than the market will bear.
17. This rationale for minimum-price regulation is similar to the use of import tariffs by
developing countries to temporarily protect fledgling domestic industries from international
competition that might have an exclusionary effect. Although neither import tariffs nor temporary
minimum-price regulations are policies with general appeal, it is theoretically possible for them to be
strategically responsive to specific structural contexts.
18. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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enforce anticompetitive collusion. As noted above, 19 regulators can be
"captured" by the firms they are supposed to restrain. Firms wishing to
collude successfully must meet four distinct requirements:
(1) reaching an agreement,
(2) detecting breaches of the agreement,
(3) punishing breaches of the agreement, and
(4) deterring entry.2"
A captured regulatory agency can dramatically facilitate collusion by
helping firms overcome each of these obstacles to collusion. Regulators
can openly promulgate regulations stating the agreed upon price, and
regulations can mandate that firms disclose the prices at which they sell.
Perhaps most importantly, industry-wide regulations can punish price
chiselers that undercut the supracompetitive price. Finally, many regu-
latory agencies have the discretion to limit new entry in certain indus-
tries. For example, public regulations limit the number of taxi licenses
used and control the difficulty of passing the bar examination to practice
law.21
By leaving fringe firms completely unregulated, dominant-firm regu-
lation undermines the ability of "captured" regulators to organize a car-
tel. To be sure, an agency can still facilitate collusive agreement among
the firms of the industry by holding meetings and announcing a collusive
price. But partial-industry intervention gives the unregulated firms
greater opportunities to undermine the three other prerequisites for prof-
itable cartelization. First, fringe firms cannot be forced to publicly dis-
close their prices, so it will be more difficult for the cartel to detect
breaches by these firms of the collusive agreement. Second, fringe firms
will not be bound by the dominant firm's regulated price, so price cutting
will not be subject to legal sanctions. Third, new entry by nondominant
firms cannot be legally proscribed. In fact, entry may even be
encouraged if minimum-price regulations are maintained and dominant
firms must wait before lowering their regulated price.22 Our argument is
not that dominant-firm regulation entirely eliminates the potential abuses
of regulatory capture. We argue only that it mitigates them.
To restrict dominant-firm prices, the designated public agency
would need to undertake the same factual inquiry as is currently con-
19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
20. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish. A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 295, 296 (1987) (outlining elements necessary to a successful cartel); D.K.
Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. EcON. Rdv. 835, 843 (1976) (same).
21. See Peltzman, supra note 2, at 239 (noting "politically appropriate" price structure creates
incentives for regulators to limit entry); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335, 344-48 (1974) (comparing the similar effect between regulatory
devices and cartelization to demonstrate the value of regulation to industry).
22. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing minimum-price restrictions on
dominant firms to encourage new entry).
1992]
HeinOnline -- 80 Cal. L. Rev. 21 1992
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
ducted in many industry-wide regulatory regimes. Namely, it would
have to determine what price would provide the regulated firm with a
"fair return" on capital. Initially, therefore, dominant-firm intervention
in the form of setting prices would not reduce the informational burden
of regulatory agencies as they would still need to estimate costs and
determine a reasonable price. The freedom of unregulated firms to
undercut the dominant firm's regulated price, however, could provide
guidance for the uncaptured but uninformed regulator. The persistence
of price cutting by fringe firms provides strong evidence for uninformed
regulators that the dominant firm's price has been set too high. Indeed,
price cutting by fringe firms might even lead the dominant firm to lobby
the agency for lower regulated prices.23
Our theory of dominant-firm regulation gains its strength from the
critiques of both the laissez-faire and industry-wide policy perspectives.
Dominant-firm regulation acknowledges the dangers of both private and
public supracompetitive pricing and proposes an alternative in which the
regulated and unregulated portions of an industry serve to check each
other's conduct. Under dominant-firm intervention, the portion of the
market that fails least will, in a sense, determine the level of competition.
If either the regulators or the unregulated firms want to set a competitive
price, then the other portion will necessarily respond and competition
will prevail.24 The law of one price25 will tend to drive the market price
toward the price generated by the more competitive portion of the indus-
try. In a world where either portion can fail to produce a competitive
price, it might be best to maintain both a regulated and an unregulated
market presence, allowing consumers the benefit of the most competitive
price that either can produce.26
23. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (noting AT&T's petition to lower its
restricted rates in response to MCI's competitive influence).
24. This result will depend on the ability of the more competitive portion to supply the
industry demand at the more competitive price, and will be limited if there are capacity constraints.
Also, as noted above, minimum-price regulations on dominant firms could constrain their ability to
match a lower fringe price.
25. Competitive markets generally approach an equilibrium with one price because individual
sellers cannot sell at a price above their competitors' prices and would not want to sell at a lower
price. For a definition and criticism of the law, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Causes and Consequences
of the Dependence of Quality on Price, 25 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1, 7-10 (1987).
26. In algebraic terms, if the regulators set a price P, and the unregulated fringe producers set a
price of P1 , then the preference of consumers to buy the cheapest product will tend to produce a
market price P. equal to P ,=min(P,Pf). The failure of regulated and unregulated firms is
represented by the deviations of their prices above the competitive level, P,. Heuristically, the
potential for public and private market failure could be modeled by having P, and P, as randomly
distributed variables. In such a crude model the superiority of dominant-firm regulation is captured
in the notion that the expected price under the mixed (partial-industry regulation) regime would be
lower than the expected price under either industry-wide or laissez-faire regimes.
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2. Fringe-Firm Intervention
An alternative partial-industry regulatory strategy focuses govern-
ment attention on fringe producers. To implement a fringe-firm strategy,
regulators would leave the dominant firm in the industry unregulated
and would intervene to affect the behavior of fringe firms. While domi-
nant-firm intervention seeks to restrain the behavior of dominant firms,
fringe-firm intervention seeks to create or maintain the existence of addi-
tional competitors. Instead of directly regulating the behavior of firms in
an industry, as with the price regulation of dominant-firm intervention,u7
fringe-firm intervention seeks to change the structure of the industry and
thereby induce more competitive behavior.2 8
A broad range of regulatory strategies could promote the existence
of additional competitors. The government could make available a wide
variety of subsidies to small competitors. It could directly subsidize new
entrants to preserve these fringe firms with loans at favorable rates.29
The government in its capacity as a consumer could also promote the
competitive presence of fringe firms by patronizing them. For example,
many American state governments attempt to promote the economic via-
bility of smaller banks by placing state government deposits with them.30
Finally, in the extreme case the government itself could enter a market as
a producer of the good in question. The diversity of these partial-indus-
try regulations is illustrated in greater detail in the case studies discussed
below.31
Efforts to increase the number of competitors in a market by such
fringe-firm interventions might structurally serve to improve the compet-
27. See supra notes 14-26.
28. Fringe-firm interventions might fit into a larger system of "structural" interventions.
Structural theories of collusion identify many structural variables, such as capacity constraints and
product differentiation, that might affect the ability of industries to fulfill the prerequisites of
successful cartelization. See generally Ayres, supra note 20, at 295-325. Further research might be
directed at explaining ways that government could intervene to alter the structural aspects of firms
and improve the competitive performance of an industry.
29. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (proposing that government might have
intervened to preserve People Express as a competitive presence in the airline industry).
30. Similarly, purchases by the United States government at one point accounted for one-half
of American Motors' sales. It might be possible to justify the minority and small-business set-aside
programs on a similar ground. See Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 477 (1987)
(suggesting that set-aside programs enable the beneficiaries to compete effectively). Many of these
measures are adopted, however, more in response to government interests in redressing past
discrimination than in restraining supracompetitive pricing.
Alternatively, fringe entry could be encouraged by a tax scheme that disproportionately taxed
incumbent firms. This program would be similar to tariff policies tailored toward spurring domestic
production. A progressive corporate-tax system might have a similar effect by giving smaller, newer
firms a competitive advantage. Although the global nature of such taxes makes them poor
instruments for targeted competitive strategies, the idea might not be lacking merit for applications
limited to specific industries.
31. See infra notes 83-116 and accompanying text.
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itive performance of an industry. Both theory and practice strongly sup-
port the proposition that in many contexts increasing the number of
competitors will engender more competitive behavior.32 For example, in
his seminal article A Theory of Oligopoly, George Stigler presented a
model showing that larger cartels would have more difficulty detecting
breaches of their agreements.33 This same outcome is replicated in sim-
ple models of tacit collusion, such as the noncooperative Cournot
model.34 The robust result in these models is that as the number of firms
increases, the market price falls toward the competitive level.35
Several studies have empirically validated this intuition. Paul
MacAvoy's detailed study of railroad cartels dramatized how the exis-
tence of even a third major competitor significantly destabilizes efforts at
cartelization.36 Studies of the airline industry confirm this result.37
Cross-sectional studies that must crudely aggregate data from disparate
industries have generated more varied results, but as Frederick Scherer
has summarized, "there is a rather robust tendency for a positive associa-
tion to emerge between seller concentration and profitability. ' 38 Again,
the preponderance of evidence supports the conclusion that fewer sellers
have a greater ability to raise prices above costs.
Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that government ownership
of businesses does not necessitate inefficient production. For example, in
Canada the publicly owned railroad has achieved the same efficiency as
its private rival.39 The possibility that fringe-firm interventions can pro-
mote competition is also directly confirmed by private interventions in
32. An important prerequisite for this position is the existence of some barriers to entry. In
perfectly contestable markets even a small number of producers might be forced to behave
competitively by the ever-present threat of potential competition.
33. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 50-51 (1971) (presenting
calculations proving the chance of detecting price cutters decreases as the number of rivals
increases).
34. In the Cournot model, which is standard in the industrial organization literature, identical
firms choose how much to produce given a fixed expectation of their competitors' production. See
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 218-21 (1988). As the number of
competitors increases, the equilibrium price drops toward the competitive price. Id. at 221-23.
35. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 262 (1989).
36. PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION: THE TRUNK-LINE
RAILROAD CARTELS AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION BEFORE 1900, at 25-78
(1965) (detailing how the entrance of third railroad brought about collapse of agreement between
two incumbent railroads).
37. See Ian Ayres, Determinants of Airline Carrier Conduct, 8 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 187
(1988) (rejecting the hypothesis that airlines are contestable markets and noting effect of structural
variables on airline collusion).
38. See SCHERER, supra note 12, at 278-79.
39. See Douglas W. Caves & Laurits R. Christensen, The Relative Efficiency of Public and
Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroads, 88 J. POL. EON. 958,
973-74 (1980); see also John Vickers & George Yarrow, Economic Perspectives on Privatization, J.
EcON. PERSP., Spring 1991, at 111 (discussing effects of privatization).
[Vol. 80:13
HeinOnline -- 80 Cal. L. Rev. 24 1992
PAR TIAL-INDUSTRY REGULATION
contiguous markets. In a number of contexts the downstream purchas-
ers of products willingly subsidize the entry and continued existence of
additional upstream competitors. This practice of "second-sourcing" is
commonly used, for example, by governments in procuring defense con-
tracts and by automobile manufacturers seeking the production of spe-
cialized inputs.'
As the name suggests, the goal of firms engaged in second-sourcing
is to promote the presence of additional sources of supply. The theory
behind second-sourcing strategies is relatively simple: downstream firms
willingly incur the costs of subsidizing additional upstream competitors
because the presence of such competitors will undermine the market
power of the incumbent producers and ultimately lower the downstream
input prices. The effectiveness of second-sourcing in reducing upstream
market power can be gleaned from the resistance of upstream incum-
bents to this strategy. For example, in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnel Corp. 41 a downstream purchaser of mechanical snubbers, a kind
of shock absorber for pipes in nuclear power plants, contracted to subsi-
dize the entry of a new upstream producer. The incumbent snubber pro-
ducer reacted immediately by cutting its downstream price and
attempting to enter into a long-term, effectively exclusive arrangement
with the purchaser. 2 Upstream incumbent producers resist second-
sourcing for the same reason that downstream consumers undertake the
strategy: additional competition will limit the ability of upstream produ-
cers to extract monopoly rents fom downstream consumers.
A striking prerequisite for private second-sourcing strategies, how-
ever, is a concentrated downstream demand for a given product.
Because second-sourcing generally entails subsidization, it is difficult to
induce all downstream firms to contribute to the second-sourcing efforts
of their competitors. Regardless of whether or not they contribute to the
subsidy, all downstream firms benefit from the competitive presence of
additional upstream firms. Thus, downstream rivals would prefer to free
ride on the investments of their rivals in establishing these upstream
competitors. In other words, second-sourcing is a public good to down-
stream competitors, and the more diffuse the downstream competitors
the less they will invest in the public good of upstream entry. Only con-
centrated downstream industries are likely to overcome the underinvest-
40. See Joseph Farrell & Nancy T. Gallini, Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly
Incentives to Attract Competition, 103 Q.J. EcoN. 673 (1988) (discussing second-sourcing as a means
to a long-term source of supply); Michael H. Riordan & David E.M. Sappington, Second Sourcing,
20 RAND J. EcON. 41, 41 (1989) (stating that the Department of Defense fosters competition
among suppliers by sustaining second sources).
41. 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
42. Id. at 229. Judge Stephen Breyer, however, rejected the arguments of the failed entrant
that this behavior constituted either actionable predation or acts of monopolization. Id. at 240.
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ment problem. It is not surprising, therefore, that leading examples of
second-sourcing occur when the downstream firm is a monopsonist of
specialized products, as is the case in the defense and automobile input
markets.
The fact that second-sourcing strategies are not undertaken in
industries with more diffuse downstream demand does not indicate, how-
ever, that such strategies could not efficiently improve competitive per-
formance. The willingness of concentrated buyers to incur the cost of
subsidization in the expectation of lower input prices is compelling prima
facie evidence of its efficiency.43 Because of the free-rider problem, how-
ever, industries with diffuse downstream competitors are unable to
undertake the collective action necessary to optimally invest in second
sources. With diffuse demand, the transaction costs of reaching such
subsidization agreements are prohibitive. Yet the fact that second-sourc-
ing is cost justified when demand is concentrated is strong evidence that
it will also be cost justified when demand is diffuse. The possibility of
efficient second-sourcing in markets with diffuse demand is a forceful
argument in favor of fringe-firm intervention, which is simply a public
form of the second-sourcing strategy. Regulators, acting as the agents of
diffuse downstream consumers, can avoid the collective action problem
of free riding and subsidize additional entry.'
Fringe-firm interventions as public attempts to encourage competi-
tion through second-sourcing have two informational advantages over
industry-wide interventions. First, efforts to promote the continued
existence of fringe firms would not put the same informational demands
on regulators as would, for example, imposing industry-wide prices.
"Existence" subsidies, which merely provide assistance to new entrants,
would require less detailed information about production costs and rea-
sonable returns.45 Second, the subsidized fringe firms would provide reg-
ulators with information to more effectively assess and regulate the
43. One should not confuse efficiency with price. It is possible that second-sourcing might
inefficiently reduce the upstream price. An upstream monopolist with low cost and high monopoly
markup might be more efficient than a competitive duopoly with lower prices but higher unit costs.
This is an example of the Williamson tradeoff. See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS:
MERGERS, CONTRACnNG, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 22-23 (1987). Consumers, however, will
prefer lower prices even if there are inefficiently higher costs of production.
44. The concepts of second-sourcing and fringe-firm intervention can be applied to
downstream production as well. Private manufacturers often are willing to subsidize downstream
retailers to promote downstream intrabrand competition and reduce the monopsony power of
individual retail buyers. Similarly, one could imagine fringe-firm government intervention creating
additional downstream copyright distributors, such as in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (only two distributors offered "blanket license" packaging
of artists' performance rights), which could be worthwhile to protect the interests of diffuse upstream
sellers.
45. This point would not always be true. To determine the smallest subsidy that would
support new entry, regulators would need to estimate the costs and revenues for the individual firms.
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performance of other firms in the industry. This is especially true when
government engages in the extreme strategy of government ownership
because the process of producing the good itself provides regulators with
more reliable firsthand cost data about other firms. Data generated from
such fringe-firm intervention can then be used to set the dominant firm's
price more precisely. Thus, fringe-firm interventions might be superior
to industry-wide intervention in an information gathering context both
by demanding less information from regulators and by supplying regula-
tors with more useful data.
In sum, the pervasive use of private second-sourcing strategies by
concentrated buyers argues in favor of public fringe-firm strategies that
also encourage the benefits of increased upstream competition. Govern-
ment is especially well placed to provide the public good of increased
competition by inducing and maintaining the structural conditions for
such competition.
3. Oligopoly Tournaments
The dichotomy between dominant and fringe firms breaks down in a
number of industries that have a small number of firms of relatively simi-
lar size. -There is, however, a third class of regulatory interventions that
could be particularly appropriate for these "oligopolies." In such
instances the very similarity of the firms makes "tournament" regulation
an effective policy tool. In a regulatory tournament an agency's treat-
ment of individual firms depends on their relative performance.
The use of grading curves in teaching is a classic example of a tour-
nament. The grades given to the individual players, or students, can be
viewed as "payoffs" that depend on the performance of others in the
class." Many current regulations also establish tournaments among
firms in an industry. Affirmative action guidelines create such a tourna-
ment because they set hiring targets for federal contractors based on the
average minority employment in the market. These guidelines create an
interdependence among the contractors because an evaluation of each
contractor's hiring practices depends on the hiring practices of others in
the market.47 Alternatively, the due-care standards applied to physician
performance in medical malpractice suits often depend upon the prevail-
ing customs of other doctors in a relevant geographic market.48 The
"diagnostically related group" method of reimbursing health care practi-
46. See RASMUSEN, supra note 35, at 167-68 (tournament games use a benchmark based on
competitors' performance).
47. See James J. Heckman & Kenneth I. Wolpin, Does the Contract Compliance Program
Work? An Analysis of Chicago Data, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 544, 546-48 (1976) (noting
steadily growing percentage of minority workers among the work force of those firms seeking
government contracts).
48. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT AND INJURY LAW §4.04, at 227-38 (1990).
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tioners in the Medicare context also exemplifies tournament competition.
This method ties Medicare payments for treating a patient to the average
costs to other physicians in treating patients having similar illnesses.49 In
addition, game theorists have paid particular attention to "patent race"
tournaments in which the first firm to innovate gains the enhanced profits
of patent protection.50
Tournament regulation is distinguishable from dominant-firm or
fringe-firm regulation by the timing of government intervention. The
essence of both dominant-firm and fringe-firm regulation is ex ante dispa-
rate treatment: some firms in an industry are regulated while others are
not. In contrast, tournament regulation involves disparate treatment
that only attaches ex post, at the end of play. From an ex ante perspec-
tive, firms competing in a regulatory tournament are treated the same:
they have an equal opportunity to "win" a tournament. For example,
any firm is free to invest resources in research and development; the dis-
parate treatment of patent protection attaches only after the patent race
has been won. From this ex ante perspective then, tournament interven-
tions are a form of industry-wide regulation that makes the payoffs to the
individual firms interdependent. Tournament regulation strives to
induce enhanced competition throughout an entire industry for a tourna-
ment's prize, thereby increasing the efficiency of the industry.
A particularly effective class of tournaments analyzed in the game-
theory literature involves a form of "yardstick competition.""1 Regula-
tors of public utilities can engender such yardstick competition by basing
each utility's price upon the average costs of other similar utilities. Such
a regulation can give individual utilities strong incentives to reduce the
cost of their own production because their regulated price is independent
of their own cost-saving efforts.5 2 Yardstick competition accordingly
creates a tournament in which a firm's profits are determined by its abil-
ity to generate lower costs than its competitors. This form of govern-
49. See Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 325-26
(1985) (discussing diagnostically related group reimbursement scheme for health-care professionals).
50. See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REv. ECON. & STAT. 348, 353
(1968) (social costs of inducing innovation can outweigh any social benefit derived); see also Richard
J. Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM.
ECON. REv. 514 (1982) (examining likelihood of dominant firms monopolizing patents to exclude
potential competitors); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Innovation and Industry Evolution, 100 Q.J. EON.
81 (1985) (stating that the belief in the existence of many future possible innovations depresses the
competition among firms to actually innovate).
51. See generally Shleifer, supra note 49, at 319-25 (providing overview of yardstick
competition generally and with structural variations); Joseph Farrell, Monopoly Slack and
Competitive Rigor: A Simple Model (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1985) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
52. This independence is true only to the point when the individual utility's costs are again
considered, together with the costs of all other utilities, in establishing a new regulated price. At that
time the utility's price would be indirectly affected by its cost-saving efforts.
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ment regulation puts the utilities in a type of prisoner's dilemma;
although they collectively prefer not to undertake the effort of reducing
cost, individually they are driven to keep ahead of their competitors. In
equilibrium, yardstick competition can induce efficient behavior in which
the utilities, striving to gain a competitive advantage, are all driven to the
competitive optimum.
In such oligopolies it may also be beneficial for the regulator to
employ either dominant- or fringe-type interventionist strategies. For
example, Michael Spence has shown that when firms incur fixed costs of
producing different types of products, competitors will be led to produce
the type or quality that is valued most by the marginal consumer-in an
effort to induce these almost indifferent consumers to buy-and ignore
the average consumer.53 Social welfare is sacrificed when such firm
behavior denies the majority of consumers their preferred product type.
Partial-industry regulation could at least theoretically overcome this
market failure by redefining the margin of customers over which unregu-
lated firms must compete.54 If partial-industry regulation constrained a
subset of firms to produce the quality or type of product preferred by the
average consumer, the competition from these firms could force the
unregulated firms to produce the more widely valued good as well.5 1
Alternatively, partial-industry regulation could force an entire industry
to treat employees better if unregulated firms are to attract employees
from a dominant firm whose working conditions are regulated.
Like fringe-firm intervention, yardstick competition has distinct
informational advantages for regulators. The crucial aspect of utility
regulation is finding the appropriate cost benchmark that will induce effi-
cient behavior and assure a sufficient return. Yardstick competition,
which bases price on an average of the cost of similar utilities, is espe-
cially attractive because utilities in otherwise distinct geographic markets
compete in a sense to lower their own costs and increase their profit.
Thus, the average utility-cost figure provides regulators with a cost
benchmark that closely approximates true cost.
Therefore, all the preceding forms of.partial-industry regulation
have the potential to foster advantageous competition. Competition will
force the unregulated firms to match the regulated contractual offers of
the regulated firms, resulting in a variety of benefits for employees and
consumers. A partial-industry regulation regime retains an unregulated
market presence that can mitigate corrupt or misguided government reg-
ulation. By delegating part of the regulatory role to the competitive pro-
53. A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417, 417 (1975).
54. See id. at 428-29.
55. In practice, however, regulators will face informational hurdles in determining the desires
of the average consumer. See id.
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cess, partial-industry regulatory regimes seek to restrain the private
exploitation of monopoly power without substituting the potential for
public exploitation through capture.5 6
In partial-industry regimes of regulation, competition between the
regulated and unregulated portions of the industry will not, however,
always engender beneficial compliance. Partial-industry regulatory strat-
egies are only likely to be appropriate when the market failure at issue
injures someone in contractual privity with the firms in the industry. For
example, partial-industry regulation will not be effective in inducing
industry-wide compliance with pollution standards. Because the people
who are injured by industrial pollution are often not, or at least not
exclusively, in privity with the offending corporations, competition will
not force the unregulated firms to match the behavior of the regulated
firms. Forcing a subset of oil companies not to spill oil will not compel
unregulated firms to take more care. Indeed, the regulated firms that
bear additional costs of regulatory compliance will put less competitive
pressure on their unregulated rivals. Yet when it is properly restricted to
market failures involving contractual privity,5 7 partial-industry regula-
tion provides an innovative possibility for improving market
performance.
In sum, partial-industry regulation can seek to promote competition
in three ways: by restraining anticompetitive behavior of dominant
firms; by promoting additional entry of fringe firms; or by engendering
tournament competition throughout the industry for an interdependent
prize. Both public and private market governance can fail to provide
efficient resource allocation. Partial-industry regulation creates dual gov-
ernance of individual markets by utilizing both public and private forces.
The competition between these public and private systems of economic
governance can serve as a check on both forms of market failure. We are
not suggesting that a government presence is appropriate in most or even
many industries. Instead, rational regulation should assess when the
types of partial-industry regulation discussed above will produce better
results than the more traditional regulatory alternatives.
56. Elsewhere we have suggested that "tripartism"-the empowerment of third-party
consumer groups with regulatory enforcement discretion--could be used to promote cooperative
regulation without falling prey to the costs of capture. See AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 6.
For a discussion of third-party participation in the regulatory process, see the Conclusion of this
Article.
57. This privity requirement for partial-industry regulation also supports our analysis of a
monopsony standard for consumer protection. See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
Monopsonists, as consumers in privity with their suppliers, often undertake strategies that mimic or
are analogous to a variety of partial-industry interventions discussed herein.
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B. A Monopsony Standard for Government Intervention
These theories of partial-industry intervention gain support from an
analysis of monopsonist behavior. The conduct of single buyers (monop-
sonists) or concentrated buyers (oligopsonists) provides a unique vantage
point for consumer-protection advocates. Because downstream monop-
sonists have market power, 8 they are often able to utilize this power to
effectively protect themselves from paying upstream prices above the
competitive level.59 In a wide variety of contexts, monopsonists will
improve market efficiency by inducing more competitive conditions of
supply. Put simply, governments interested in promoting consumer wel-
fare should often emulate what a monopsonist consumer would do.
This monopsony standard for government intervention can support
many of the partial-industry regulations discussed above. Most directly,
a monopsony analysis underscores the potential usefulness of fringe-firm
intervention. One way to reformulate a regulator's decision about
whether to use a particular form of fringe-firm intervention is to ask
58. The determination of market power is linked to the underlying definition and boundaries of
a relevant market. For example, under the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines relevant
antitrust markets are defined so that the market includes all colluding sellers who would have the
ability to raise prices by 5%. ANTrrrusT Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES 4 (1982) ("ITihe Department will hypothesize a price increase of five
percent and ask how many buyers would be likely to shift to ... other products within one year.")
Analogously, if the industry has an upward-sloping supply curve, a monopsonist buyer with market
power should have the ability to lower the price. See infra note 59.
59. At times monopsonists have incentives to distort supply by inefficiently depressing their
demand to lower the cost of goods purchased. Figure 1, below, illustrates that monopsonists will
only purchase up to the point at which the marginal cost of the good purchased, depicted as the
marginal-outlay line, equals the monopsonist's marginal value, depicted as the demand curve. If the
production of the good involves the use of scarce resources so that the supply curve is upward
sloping, then the monopsonist will restrict the amount it purchases below the competitive level, q,,
to the monopsonist's equilibrium demand of q.. By suppressing the quantity demanded, the
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whether a downstream monopsonist would be willing to subsidize
upstream entry. The decisions of a hypothetical monopsonist would rep-
licate a consumer-welfare standard because such a downstream con-
sumer fully internalizes the costs and benefits of the second-sourcing
strategy and would not subsidize an upstream firm unless the ultimate
benefits it would reap outweigh the costs of the venture.' In short, gov-
ernment should consider second-sourcing where a monopsonist would.61
The monopsony standard also supports the use of what Richard
Romano has called "excessive consumption" by government.62 In indus-
tries with large fixed costs and declining marginal costs it is possible that
average costs will everywhere be above the consumer demand curve. In
this situation no producer can profitably supply any level of demand and
there might be no entry into the industry even though the forgone con-
sumer surplus on inframarginal purchases would make production
socially efficient. Romano has shown that consumers might therefore
engage in excess consumption-consumption beyond their nonstrategic,
normal levels of demand-to make production profitable and induce
entry.63  Thus, Romano is able to explain why residents of Lake
Wobegon would be willing to buy their toasters at the local hardware
store even though the purchase would be cheaper at the K-Mart in a
bigger city.6
Just as second-sourcing promotes the entry of second (or third)
sources of supply, excessive consumption can be thought of as a form of
"primary-sourcing" that seeks to encourage an initial source of supply.
But as with second-sourcing, excessive consumption of this type is
unlikely to be a successful form of fringe-firm intervention if there is a
diffuse group of consumers: each consumer would prefer to have the
others bear the cost of subsidizing the excessive consumption. As before,
government employing the monopsony standard might act on behalf of
diffuse groups to maintain adequate consumption and ensure a source of
supply.
The minimum-price regulation involved in dominant-firm interven-
tion can have an analogous second-sourcing effect. As seen in the Barry
60. Downstream monopsonists might also engage in second-sourcing to ensure an
uninterrupted supply of an essential input that would be threatened if a single supplier faced a strike
or natural disaster. These additional reasons for private second-sourcing equally justify government
intervention on behalf of diffuse consumers when assurance of an uninterrupted supply is desirable.
61. However, government might not wish to second-source in all situations that a monopsonist
would because the government's cost of implementation and administration of the regulatory scheme
might outweigh the benefits.
62. See Richard E. Romano, When Excessive Consumption is Rational, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
553, 553 (1991).
63. See id. at 562 ("Individuals consume beyond their demands to keep the firm in business
and to protect their surpluses.").
64. Id. at 553 (citing GARRISON KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON DAYS 95-96 (1985)).
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Wright case,6" incumbent producers are likely to cut prices in response to
second-sourcing strategies designed to foster new entry. A monopsonist
can retain the benefits of these price cuts and the competitive benefits of
second-sourcing by continuing to buy a certain proportion of its demand
from higher priced new entrants. When demand for a product is dif-
fusely distributed among several competitors, however, it can be difficult
to organize these individual buyers to purchase a proportion of their
demand from higher priced entrants. Individual buyers, while wanting
the increased competition, would rather buy from the lower priced
incumbent. Thus, each buyer would leave it to its competitors to pay the
second-sourcing subsidy, destroying any agreement among them. Mini-
mum-price regulation of incumbent sellers facing new entry is an indirect
way of re-creating the result of monopsonistic or oligopsonistic buying
groups: the fixed minimum price removes the ability of individual buyers
to chisel on a second-sourcing strategy and allows new entrants with
higher initial production costs to survive.16
Maximum-price regulation of dominant firms and oligopoly tourna-
ments can also be seen as public analogues of private monopsony behav-
ior. The market power of a monopsonist will, like maximum-price
regulation, allow it to constrain the ability of dominant firms to sell at
supracompetitive prices. Monopsonists wishing to retain the procompe-
titive effects of fringe suppliers would rationally negotiate individualized
prices related to the costs of the individual sellers. Thus, the maximum
prices resulting from cost-conscious negotiations by monopsonists with
dominant firms are likely to be lower than the prices negotiated with
higher cost fringe suppliers. This is similar to a partial-industry interven-
tion scheme employing both dominant-firm price setting and fringe-firm
subsidization. The monopsony standard harmonizes so well with partial-
industry regulatory strategies because monopsonists often find it in their
interest to negotiate individualized deals with their suppliers. Disparate
treatment is then the essence of the monopsonist's attempts at consumer
self-protection.67
65. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
66. Minimum-price regulation substitutes for direct second-sourcing strategies-but at a cost.
Monopsonists that second-source can still buy from incumbents at a lower price than the subsidized
entrant. Minimum-price regulation forces consumers, even the nonsubsidized incumbents, to buy
from all producers at a higher price. Of course, under a monopsonist supported second-sourcing
scheme the incumbent dominant firms know that monopsonists might continue to purchase from
new entrants at a higher price, and will therefore have reduced incentives to cut their price. Thus,
the amount of price cutting in response to entry will not be as great when there is monopsonist
demand and consequently the relative cost of minimum-price regulation will not be as high.
67. The individualized negotiation of price is often referred to as "price discrimination."
Although the practice of negotiating individual prices is often used to extract consumer surplus by
sellers with market power, see Ayres, supra note 8, at 827-33 (discussing price discrimination
techniques), price discrimination can also be used by consumers to extract producer surplus from the
supply side of the market.
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Finally, the private use of explicit and implicit tournaments, which
make suppliers' profits dependent on the conduct of their competitors,
argues for greater consideration of public interventions of this form.
Buyers with market power routinely use not only explicit bidding but in
dynamic contexts they also make decisions about repeat business depend-
ing on the relative levels of service provided by suppliers. In addition,
firms buying services from their employees often resort to contests that
reward employees on their relative marketing success or performance.
A monopsony standard provides not only a powerful tool for ana-
lyzing how government might intervene to protect consumers but also a
limiting principle for determining when intervention is appropriate. For
although the private practice of second-sourcing provides powerful evi-
dence that there are situations where public second-sourcing or fringe-
firm intervention might benefit consumers, the fact that second-sourcing
is not undertaken by all monopsonists suggests that there will be many
situations in which fringe-firm intervention is not appropriate. There-
fore, the monopsony standard provides a sufficient condition for govern-
mental nonintervention but only a necessary condition for intervention.
By this we mean that if a monopsonist would not intervene to second-
source, then that should be sufficient to deter government from interven-
ing on behalf of a more diffuse group of consumers. But the converse
does not hold. The fact that a monopsonist would second-source does
not imply that government should. The costs of administering public
second-sourcing-including the possibility of captured partial industry
regulation-might militate against government intervention even in
those situations when monopsonists would act. Thus, the monopsony
standard at once holds out the possibility of beneficial partial regulation
but at the same time provides a one-tailed test to circumscribe its use.
The industrial-organization literature is a rich source of information
that can shed light on the application of this hypothetical monopsony
standard. In attempting to analyze how a hypothetical monopsonist
would behave, consumer-protection advocates might begin by assessing
the degree to which additional competitors are likely to reduce an indus-
try's prices. Monopsonists will tend to second-source when the ultimate
gains from lower input prices exceed the costs of the initial second-sourc-
ing subsidy. As is generally the case, the final analysis will turn on an
empirical assessment of the costs and benefits of the regulation, including
the costs of agency capture.68
68. The presence of several similarly sized firms in a partial-industry regulatory environment
might serve to offset the ability of any individual firm to "capture" an agency. Partial-industry
regulation would prompt firms to compete with each other, while current industry-wide regulatory
approaches place firms on equal footing and encourage them to share a common and powerful
regulatory agenda.
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Because the forms of partial-industry regulation are so diverse, the
specific administrative details and difficulties of such intervention are
largely beyond the scope of this Article, although some particulars are
discussed below in the industry studies.69 Our goal here is to point to the
possibility of a new genre of regulatory possibilities that is, unfortunately,
largely being ignored by the public sector despite having long been a sta-
ple of private consumer protection. The possibility of fringe-firm inter-
vention or public second-sourcing on behalf of consumers is politically
unacceptable to the current laissez-faire regulatory mind-set. Critics
should recognize, however, that authorizing government agencies to dis-
parately subsidize fringe-firm production is less invasive than many tradi-
tional forms of industry-wide regulation, such as the airline-fare
regulation that prevailed for several decades prior to deregulation.70 The
fact that consumers with market power often protect themselves with
private analogues to partial-industry intervention supports the argument
that government should emulate these strategies to protect less powerful
groups of consumers.
C. Equal Protection Impediments to Partial-Industry Regulation
The potential benefits stemming from the various forms of partial-
industry regulation will generate unique problems of administration and
enforcement. This Section highlights Equal Protection as an important
equitable difficulty inherent in partial-industry regulation.71 A chief
complaint among industry participants would concern the fundamental
69. See infra notes 83-117 and accompanying text.
70. For a discussion of fringe-firm subsidies for airline passenger service, see infra notes 100-01
and accompanying text.
71. In general economic regulation will not be struck down on equal protection grounds. In
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976), the United States Supreme Court stated
that it would take a deferential approach to any equal protection challenge to state economic
regulation. The city of New Orleans had banned pushcart vendors from the French Quarter but
allowed those that had been there for a long time to remain. An excluded vendor argued that the
grandfather-clause provision violated his equal protection rights. The Court rejected his challenge,
noting that unless the distinction drawn by a regulation "trammels fundamental personal rights or is
drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions," it need only be "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." Id. The Court specifically overruled Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), which was the
"only case in the last half century to invalidate a wholly economic regulation solely on equal
protection grounds." Dukes 427 U.S. at 306.
The Dukes Court noted that the rational relationship between a regulatory scheme and its
objective need not reflect "mathematical exactitude." Id at 303. Specifically, regulations are
permissible if implemented "step by step" and if they "only partially ameliorate a perceived evil."
Id. Thus, regulatory tactics such as piecemeal escalation of government intervention affecting only
dominant or fringe firms would be permissible under Dukes. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (stating that "the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all"); Metropolis
Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69 (1913) (asserting that "[tihe problems of government
are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations"); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (holding that a "classification having some
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fairness of treating firms differently. For example, under dominant-firm
intervention those firms subject to price regulation would argue that it is
unfair for their competitors to go unregulated. Under fringe-firm inter-
vention, those firms without government subsidies would argue that it is
unfair that they are not also receiving the benefits of such regulation. Yet
it is important to stress that the equal protection principle only mandates
that similarly situated entities be treated equally.72 In fact, the principle
of Equal Protection may be violated when dissimilar people are treated
similarly.73 Of course in applying this principle, much turns on what
counts as a relevant similarity. 4
The arguments of the previous Sections have suggested that domi-
nant and fringe firms are dissimilar in terms of their competitive impact
on an industry and that their dissimilarities provide a rational basis for
disparate treatment.75 It is important to emphasize that the standard of
scrutiny of the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause applicable here is
less stringent than it is for other regulations, such as those involving the
"fundamental rights" of citizens. This is especially true with regard to
the type of economic regulation at issue in this Article. Thus, a partial-
industry regulatory scheme that makes distinctions based on the size or
incumbency of an industry's firms would most likely survive the modest
scrutiny mandated by the Supreme Court's parsing of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.76
Yet there may be times when the community would benefit from
applying dominant-firm or fringe-firm regulatory strategies to individual
firms within a fairly homogeneous oligopoly. In such oligopolies, com-
reasonable basis does not offend against [the Equal Protection Clause] merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality").
72. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword. In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 19-20
(1972) (discussing development of equal protection doctrine requiring only equal treatment of
similarly situated groups).
73. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 1438 (2d ed.
1988) (equality can be denied when government fails to distinguish between persons who should be
regarded differently for equal protection purposes).
74. For example, one could not treat people differently because their names were different
unless their names were a legitimate characteristic upon which to distinguish treatment. See Joseph
Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949)
(determination of whether classification is reasonable because it includes all who are similarly
situated depends on definition of "similarly situated"); see also Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 125 (1972) (discussing Supreme Court's
rejection of drawing a statutory distinction between married and unmarried persons).
75. See supra notes 14-45 and accompanying text (discussing dominant-firm and fringe-firm
theory).
76. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109 (1979) ("We accept such imperfection because it is
in turn rationally related to the secondary objective of legislative convenience."); TRIBE, supra note
72, § 16-2, at 1440 ("[C]ourts have traditionally exhibited extreme deference to the legislative
definition of 'the general good,' either out of judicial sympathy for the difficulties of the legislative
process, or out of a belief in judicial restraint generally.").
[Vol. 80:13
HeinOnline -- 80 Cal. L. Rev. 36 1992
PAR TIAL-IND USTR Y REG ULA TION
petitive advantages can still result from restraining the pricing of individ-
ual firms. The regulation is no longer rationalized on differences between
the firms, however, and the very similarity of the firms increases their
equitable claim when only one is subject to regulation. Regulators can
respond to these equitable concerns in two ways without forfeiting the
benefits of single-firm intervention. First, it may be possible to turn the
government's choice of regulation into a tournament itself. If the gov-
ernment decides that it should restrain the behavior of an individual firm
within an oligopoly, for example by regulating the quality of its prod-
uct,77 it might choose to single out the firm that has behaved least com-
petitively in the past. Individual firms trying to avoid the price
regulation could then compete to avoid the regulatory constraint by pric-
ing more competitively in the preregulation periods. Second, the govern-
ment might randomly choose the firm that is to be the object of the price
regulation in a given finite period, and different firms could be chosen in
each successive period. As discussed above,7" such a decision rule would
put the similar firms in the same ex ante position and, if viewed from this
perspective, there would be no disparate treatment.79
The more substantive risk with this last decision rule is that firms
would be singled out nonrandomly in a systematic effort to exclude them
from the market. Regulators captured by certain firms in an industry
might purposefully regulate other firms to put them at a competitive dis-
advantage. If individual firms could cause regulators to force their rivals
to increase prices or undertake inefficient modes of production, then the
regulated rivals could be effectively excluded from the market. Rather
than fulfill their intended purpose of mitigating industry cartelization,
partial-industry regulations might instead facilitate the raising of rivals'
costs.80 Even more perniciously, regulators might threaten burdensome
77. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing government regulation of quality
of oligopoly products).
78. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing difference between ex ante and ex post intervention).
79. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing tournament regulations applying disparate treatment ex
post, at the end of play). A random-choice rule seems outlandish but tax-auditing choices are, for
example, often made stochastically. In calculating the fairness of random intervention one should
distinguish between "equal protection" arguments and "takings" arguments. Equal protection
arguments focus on disparate treatment of the regulated and the unregulated. On the other hand,
takings arguments would suggest that it is unfair to restrain a regulated firm without just
compensation irrespective ofgovernments' treatment of competitors. It would be difficult to imagine
that the government could be constrained on takings grounds from regulating a single firm when it
could nonetheless regulate an entire industry. In this instance the greater takings power includes the
smaller. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court; 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4, 8 & n.ll (1988) (citing
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-47 (1986), for the proposition
that the "greater" power to bar gambling also includes the "lesser" power to bar gambling
advertisements).
80. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267,
268 (1983) (discussing exclusionary practices having the effect of raising rival's costs).
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regulation of individual firms as a way of extracting "rents" from com-
petitors in an industry who wish to avoid these costs."' The appropriate-
ness of partial-industry regulation would turn on the ability of society to
control these deleterious forms of capture and rent seeking. While not
rising to the level of a constitutional violation, the threat that govern-
ment disparate treatment of economic persons could be capricious or
malevolently enacted suggests that nonconstitutional equal protection
concerns might remain.
In short there are no serious equal protection concerns with the two
most important types of partial-industry regulation: dominant firms
bearing the cost of regulation while less powerful fringe firms escape that
cost, and weak, fringe firms receiving a benefit, which is denied to
stronger competitors, keeping or bringing them into existence. In the
case of regulatory costs being imposed selectively on equally matched
firms, however, equal protection concerns might need to be addressed.
We have suggested tournaments, lotteries, and turn taking as equitable
solutions to the problem of equal treatment. These suggestions might be
susceptible to capture and corruption, however, when regulator decisions
involve selective placement of restrictions. Openness, accountability, and
rights of appeal are vital measures to allow victims of captured decisions
a form of redress. The measure we favor for safeguarding against cap-
ture and corruption is the explicit involvement of representatives elected
by consumer groups in the regulatory process.82
II
APPLICATIONS
The theories elaborated above have been implemented to varying
degrees in several regulatory contexts. In this Part we explore the actual
and potential use of partial-industry regulation by examining in detail
case studies in four industries: oil, airline service, news media, and long-
distance telephone service.
A. Destabilizing OPEC
After thirteen years of successful collusion, the oil cartel of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) disintegrated in
1986. The cartel dissolved when price chiseling by individual member
81. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102-03 (1987) (arguing politicians can extract "rents" from
private actors by threatening to impose burdensome restrictions on them unless a certain payment is
met).
82. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 (discussing delegation of regulator enforcement
to third parties); Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Trpartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment,
6 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 801, 807-10 (1991) (discussing tripartism policy). For a discussion of third-
party regulatory participation, see the Conclusion of this Article.
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nations instigated a price war that more than halved the price of oil. The
instability of OPEC was brought on in part by the downturn in United
States demand for oil. With reduced demand, some OPEC members
could no longer stay within their OPEC production quota and still gener-
ate the revenues required for domestic programs. To increase revenues,
the poorest oil-exporting nations began to cut the cartel price in an effort
to regain some lost demand.8 3
In the wake of Iraq's unsuccessful invasion of Kuwait, OPEC may
be on the verge of reestablishing its ability to control oil prices. 4 The
conditions for successful cartelization have improved: both Iraqi and
Kuwaiti oil-production capacity have been limited by the war's destruc-
tion, and world demand and consumption of oil has returned to higher
pre-OPEC rates of growth. OPEC's recent success in forming agree-
ments among member nations for modest reductions in their production
quotas might be the harbinger of a more disciplined cartel in the future.8"
It is natural to ask whether the United States, the primary importer
of energy and consequently the primary victim of the OPEC cartel, could
do anything to prevent the resurgence of a cartel that had disrupted the
world economy for thirteen years.86 We argue that partial-industry
intervention that exploits the inherent instability of cartels could achieve
this objective. Individual members of OPEC have powerful incentives to
violate OPEC's strict price and production limits. For example, by cut-
ting price slightly a producer could sell much more oil at a still highly
inflated price. In deciding whether to engage in such price chiseling,
OPEC members must weigh the potential gains from price chiseling
against the possibility of lost future profits if a price war ensues. If
enough members believe the gains will outweigh the possible losses and
therefore decide to chisel, the cartel will disintegrate.
The presence of even a few cartel chiselers can cut into the profits of
the remaining members and thus drastically reduce the effectiveness of a
cartel. As OPEC's experience in the 1980s suggests, price chiselers are
by themselves very powerful destabilizing forces. When oil-exporting
debtor nations, such as Nigeria and Libya, routinely began to lower their
prices and exceed their production limits to increase their oil revenues,
Saudi Arabia, the dominant OPEC producer, retaliated in kind by driv-
83. See generally Ayres, supra note 20, at 314-16 (1987) (sketching events leading to OPEC's
collapse).
84. See Steven Greenhouse, Deal Set on OPEC Cut, but Not All Are Happy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 1991, at DI (predicting that OPEC's agreement to cut oil production would push prices higher).
85. Moreover, OPEC-member states might have lowered their domestic-revenue requirements
after operating for more than four years with depressed oil prices. See id.; cf Stephen Koepp, "The
Price War Is Here" TIME, Feb. 17, 1986, at 54 (discussing 1986 fall in OPEC prices after member
nations boosted oil production to increase revenues and satisfy domestic programs).
86. A related matter is whether the United States could have hastened OPEC's collapse in
1986.
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ing the price of oil to less than half the former level.87 But the history of
OPEC also indicates that these incentives to chisel do not always pre-
clude collusion. After all, the inherent instability of cartels did not keep
OPEC from gouging oil consumers for more than a decade, and it cannot
insure competition in the future. Although the OPEC ministers seem
now to be in disarray, there is no guarantee that a new Sheik Yamani will
not forge another strong Arab alliance or that in the future demand will
not again outstrip non-OPEC supply and force importers to comply with
cartel restrictions.
Partial-industry strategies, however, could have been used in the
past and might be implemented in the future to undermine the ability of
OPEC to raise oil price above production costs. These intervention strat-
egies cannot take the form of direct regulatory fiat-as, for example, with
dominant-firm price regulation-because one nation has no regulatory
jurisdiction over the pricing decisions of other sovereign states. Struc-
tural incentives directed at individual member states, however, might
induce competitive behavior in the oil market. Simply stated, the United
States and its allies could destabilize OPEC by enhancing the already
existing incentives for individual producer nations to breach the OPEC
agreement.
An optimal strategy of destabilization would employ a mixture of
carrots and sticks to achieve this end. Offering a "carrot" in the form of
debt forgiveness, favored-nation trading status, additional foreign aid, or
promises of diplomatic and military support in the event of attack to
specific oil-producing nations could thus be conditioned on increased oil
production. Linking badly needed economic-development loans and
their refinancing to the betrayal of OPEC might be especially effective
because the need for oil revenues to maintain existing debts had induced
Nigeria and Venezuela to cheat the cartel in the first place. For years the
International Monetary Fund has been conditioning loans on such fac-
tors as the borrower's fiscal deficit or money supply.88 Countries wishing
to achieve OPEC destabilization could simply make monetary assistance
dependent upon a different characteristic of the borrowing state: its oil
production. Similarly, the United States could also induce competition
with the "stick" of threatening to withdraw necessary aid from certain
nations.
This form of partial-industry regulation-using incentives and pen-
alties to change the behavior of OPEC members-is somewhat of a
hybrid intervention strategy. It would employ fringe-firm techniques of
87. See Koepp, supra note 85.
88. See Philippines to Raise Taxes, Power Costs in Bid for Loans, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,
1990, at 1, abstract available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURABS file (noting Philippine
Government's efforts to reduce its deficit to secure International Monetary Fund loans).
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inducing firm action to reach an effect akin to dominant-firm price regu-
lation because the goal would be to restrain the anticompetitive behavior
of individual firms. Although the countries influenced by such policies
might be relatively small producers, the combined effect of their actions
could have the same weight as a similar action by a dominant country.
The example of OPEC is useful because it demonstrates the wide
variety of policy options that could be available for implementing partial-
industry regulatory strategies. The strategy suggested for OPEC is both
feasible and cost-effective. The inefficiency of cartelization implies that
consumers lose more than producers gain. Supracompetitive pricing pro-
duces a deadweight loss that represents this net social inefficiency. The
gain to producers from cartelization is represented in Figure 2 below, by
the area in rectangle 1. Supracompetitive pricing produces a deadweight
loss, however, represented by triangle 2, so that total consumer losses
from cartelization equal the area in rectangle 1 and the deadweight loss
in triangle 2. Thus, cartel pricing results in a net social inefficiency








Area 1 = Cartel Profits
Area 2 = Dead-weight Loss





(Potential size of bribe to increase
output to competitive quantity)
FIGURE 2: The Possibility of Efficient Cartel Bribes
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offsetting gain to producers.8 9
Theoretically, consumers could avoid the deadweight loss by paying
a cartel a lump-sum bribe equal to the amount the producers would gain
by producing only the cartel quantity in exchange for the cartel's agree-
ment to produce the competitive quantity. This is a theoretical possibil-
ity for all cartels but as noted in our discussion of second-sourcing
subsidies90 the tremendous collective-action problems of such multilat-
eral agreements prevent diffuse oil consumers from reaching this benefi-
cial result themselves. The United States, however, is well positioned to
overcome the tendency of individual consumers to free ride on the brib-
ery investments of others. An efficiency bribe of this type would repre-
sent a kind of "industry-wide" intervention if the government negotiated
a lump-sum bribe to all of OPEC to increase its production.91
Partial-industry strategies might, however, achieve the same results
as these industry-wide interventions at a fraction of the cost. By exploit-
ing the inherent destabilizing incentives for cartel cheating, the United
States government would not need to take on all of OPEC in order to
maintain competition in the oil market. As argued above,92 the presence
of a small number of competitive firms can have a dramatic procompeti-
tive effect on a market. Thus, the United States might only need to pay a
few OPEC nations to defect from the cartel to result in competitive
prices. Targeted destabilization might not even require the payment of a
bribe: the threat of punishment by the United States, such as reduced
credit or aid, could be just as effective as the promise of a bribe in encour-
aging individual countries to defect from OPEC production limits.
Finally, the instability of OPEC in the 1980s illustrated the willingness of
several nations to chisel even in the absence of targeted destabilization.
These factors indicate that the size of the prizes or punishments might
not need to be great to induce individual countries to breach the cartel
agreement.93
89. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 241-43 (1976).
90. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
91. A potential difficulty with this scheme is that other oil consuming nations would benefit
from the increased production along with the United States. It is uncertain whether the United
States could persuade them to contribute their share of the "bribe" money. If not, an international
free-rider problem would arise. In light of recent American success in securing contributions and
cooperation for the Persian Gulf War from several industrial nations, such a problem might be
surmountable. See John Barry, "Good to Go'" NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 1991, at 26 (noting British and
French participation in Gulf War offensive).
92. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text (discussing fringe-firm interventions).
93. Indeed, in the framework of our model Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait and
threatened invasion of Saudi Arabia can be seen as a form of partial-industry intervention aimed at
shoring up oil prices. Saddarn Hussein explicitly justified Iraq's action as a targeted punishment of
Kuwait for violating its OPEC production quota. Moreover, the subsequent massing of Iraqi troops
on the Saudi border has been interpreted as a threat designed to force Saudi Arabia to curtail its
production. See Martin Sieff, Kuwait Invasion Prompts Little Saudi Response, WASH. TIMm, Aug.
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An overt policy of targeted destabilization might, however, have
costs that go beyond the economic implementation of the regulation
scheme. For example, partial-industry strategies might affect diplomatic
relations with Middle Eastern states. Some people might criticize pun-
ishments that inequitably target certain third-world countries; others
might disdain bribes as a type of ransom for economic terrorists. More-
over, the United States might have reasons for not wanting lower domes-
tic oil prices available to consumers.94 Nevertheless, policy makers
should at least realize that targeted partial-industry strategies could rep-
resent a powerful tool to ensure competitive oil prices.
If it were operated privately in the United States, the OPEC cartel
would be a criminal conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Sherman
Antitrust Act.95 Yet the United States' response to the cartel has been to
attempt to hide from its effects by making itself less energy dependent.
Reduced energy dependence is something we may independently wish to
support to be more responsible global citizens. Energy independence,
however, is an industry-wide response to threatened cartelization. The
unregulated market provides strong incentives for price chiseling by car-
tel members that can eventually cause cartels to disintegrate. But as
OPEC has shown us, "eventually" can be a painfully expensive period.
Partial-industry intervention using targeted incentives that encourage
individual nations to cut prices or increase output can move beyond a
policy of blind faith in eventual cartel demise to a more rational tactic
that encourages the undermining of OPEC and the promotion of
competition.
B. Bailing Out People Express
In a 1986 decision that was consistent with the Reagan administra-
tion's lax antitrust enforcement, the Justice Department's Antitrust Divi-
sion approved the merger of People Express and Texas Air.9 6 People
6, 1990, at A8 (noting Iraqi military pressure on Saudi Arabia to change its production policy and
support for this pressure in neighboring Arab nations hoping to raise oil prices).
94. There are, however, alternate methods of maintaining the benefits of high oil prices that
would allow the Unites States government to reap the rewards rather than OPEC. An import tariff
on oil could protect domestic producers by allowing them to charge a price high enough to cover
their higher costs of production without forgoing the benefits of lower OPEC prices. The United
States government would retain those benefits through tariff revenues. Similarly, higher taxes on oil
could continue to encourage energy conservation and its resulting environmental benefits while
converting the deadweight loss of supracompetitive pricing into a tax benefit for the government.
95. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Even with the explicit involvement of foreign governments,
such extraterritorial restraint on prices might fall within the Act's coverage. See id. § 6a (setting
forth a two-part test for determining whether foreign conduct affecting United States trade or
commerce violates the Sherman Act).
96. See Andy Pasztor & William M. Carley, People Express Bid by Texas Air Clears a Hurdle,
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Express had been a price cutter, charging sometimes as little as a third of
the going fare. People's presence in the airline industry had dramatically
affected the nature of competition on the routes it served, forcing other
airlines to engage in fierce price competition. After the loss of People
Express as an independent market force, fare increases on the routes that
People had serviced followed almost immediately, just as transatlantic
fares increased after Sir Freddie Laker's financial demise.
The Clayton Act forbids mergers if their effect "may be substan-
tially to lessen competition."97 Under the Reagan administration's anti-
trust policies, however, even the foreseeability of higher prices did not
mean that the merger would lessen competition enough to be con-
demned. Approval of the People Express merger stemmed in part from
the losses that People had been sustaining. The airline was classified as a
failing firm9" that was likely to join its subsidiary Frontier in bankruptcy.
The Justice Department reasoned that because People Express would be
lost either through merger or bankruptcy, preventing the merger would
not preserve competition.99
Regulatory choices, however, need not be this restrictive. The fail-
ing-firm doctrine is flawed because it does not seriously consider the ben-
efits of fringe-firm intervention, which would have maintained People
Express as an independent market force. This intervention might take
any one of a number of forms, from a bailout to an outright purchase of
the firm. Single-firm interventions that maintain the existence of individ-
ual firms have occurred in the past-the bailout of Chrysler is a notable
example. Past interventions of this sort have been primarily motivated
by concerns for labor, such as in the case of the Amtrak bailout. Yet as
discussed above, competitive concerns about the general welfare of con-
sumers could also justify a bailout. As the experience of People Express
illustrates, the continued presence of a single price cutter can beneficially
discipline an industry.
Single-firm intervention is by no means a panacea. One of the chief
problems of such regulation would be to maintain the price-cutting con-
duct of the fringe firm after the bailout. But merely increasing the
number of competitors can by itself undermine the ability of dominant
firms to charge supracompetitive prices."° When the prices in a market
WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1986, at A2 (reporting on the U.S. Department of Justice's clearing the
purchase of People Express and Frontier Airlines by Texas Air).
97. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
98. Emery's Failing Finances Spur Approval of Merger, AvIATION WK. & SPAcE TECH., Apr.
10, 1989, at 97.
99. See id. (under "failing firm doctrine" an anticompetitive acquisition is allowed if the
acquired firm would otherwise be unable to meet its obligations and emerge as a viable competitor).
100. On the other hand, continuing subsidies might also undermine the incentives of regulated
firms to undertake cost-saving ventures. Accordingly, government regulators should keep fringe
firms in an industry only at costs that reflect efficient production. To ensure this efficiency,
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have been persistently and disproportionately high or when a merger is
likely to generate such high prices, then taking over or subsidizing a fail-
ing firm that would serve as a price cutter might be the most effective
method of promoting competition. Once again, we need not believe that
firm intervention is without cost,""1 only that it is better than the alterna-
tives of doing nothing or intervening on a larger scale through divestiture
or industry-wide regulation.
The previous analysis of second-sourcing refuted the claim that pub-
lic ownership of an individual firm falls outside the proper domain of
government action. In markets that have consistently failed to produce
competitive behavior, competition is itself a public good whose provision
and preservation are within the classic scope of government action.
When People Express cut prices to increase its sales, the resulting bene-
fits did not inure to that airline alone: lower fares were paid by both
People's passengers as well as the passengers of other airlines because of
the People-inspired competition within the industry. Thus, government
subsidization of People Express could have paid big dividends to con-
sumers in general by keeping all airline fares low.
The argument that People Express failed because it was inefficient
and that subsidizing its future existence would only have prolonged this
inefficiency ignores the realities of private second-sourcing. The essence
of second-sourcing is a subsidy from downstream firms to an upstream
firm with high costs. The subsidy is designed to maintain a competitive
presence in the upstream market. Not only is it a theoretical possibility
that the inefficiency of maintaining a higher cost upstream producer is
outweighed by the increased competition in the upstream market, but the
prevalence of second-sourcing by monopsonist buyers is strong evidence
that the subsidization of failing firms can be efficient. In markets without
concentrated consumer demand, such as the oil and airline-service indus-
tries, government can be well positioned to act on the behalf of consum-
ers in making such a subsidy.
Competition could be fostered even further if the regulator exploited
the very fact that single-firm subsidies discriminate against other firms in
the industry. As argued in the previous Section, the government might
regulators might create tournaments among potential fringe firms to determine the least-cost
subsidy.
While yearly subsidies should not exceed the social benefits they generate, it can be sound policy
for the subsidies to be continuing. Returning to our analogy of private second-sourcing, see supra
notes 58-70, it is important to note that some firms, such as General Motors, are willing to provide
direct and indirect subsidies to their suppliers on an ongoing basis to retain second sources for
inputs. Similarly, it can be advisable for government in comparable situations to regularly bail out
failing yet competitive producers on behalf of the citizenry.
101. Nor must we deny that an important cost of bailing out failing firms is an erosion of market
discipline. Further, we concede that initially efficient subsidies can be politically difficult to remove
when they later become inefficient.
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purposefully create a tournament in which the firms in an industry com-
pete against each other for the privileged position. The subsidy could be
awarded on the basis of competition itself, going to the largest price cut-
ter among the competing firms. People Express easily met this standard.
Creating a tournament that rewards price cutting could create dramatic
incentives for firms to defect from collusive cartel arrangements. How-
ever, the current era of airline deregulation complicates the analysis. It is
possible that the new threat of potential competition in the airline indus-
try might keep the fares low on some of People's former routes, reducing
the need for a competitive presence. Nevertheless, study after study
questions the hypothesis that airline routes are contestable-that entry is
free and exit costless.'0 2
People Express will not be the last price cutter to end in bankruptcy
or merger.10 3 Price cutting is a risky business, and it may be socially
desirable to provide some insurance for this strategy in instances where
consumers would certainly benefit. While we do not argue that the
government should frequently bail out failing firms, we do believe that
competitive bailouts deserve reassessment. In the end one might con-
clude that it is administratively too difficult for government regulators to
identify the worthy recipients of an "efficiency" bailout. But the fact that
private consumers are often willing to buy or subsidize failing upstream
suppliers is at least sufficient evidence to shift the burden to those who
would dismiss such interventions out of hand.
A final, more recent example that dramatizes the potential con-
sumer benefits from fringe-firm intervention involves a 1989 United
States Supreme Court decision allowing the Detroit News and the
Detroit Free Press to merge."' The two papers had previously been
fierce competitors and had claimed losses in recent years. Industry ana-
lysts predicted, however, that the merger, technically called a "joint
operating agreement," would ultimately generate profits for the two
papers of up to $100 million per year. In addition, by eliminating compe-
tition the merger almost certainly increased advertising rates in the city.
Even if the Detroit newspaper market was a natural monopoly, in the
sense that two competitive firms could not both recoup their fixed costs,
it might have been in the city's interest to subsidize one or both firms and
102. See, eg., Ayres, supra note 37, at 197 (analysis rejects hypothesis that airline routes are
contestable); Gregory D. Call & Theodore E. Keeler, Airline Deregulation, Fares, and Market
Behavior: Some Empirical Evidence, in ANALYTICAL STUDIES IN TRANSPORT ECONOMICS 221, 223-
25 (Andrew F. Daughety ed., 1986).
103. Since December of 1990, Continental, Pan Am, and Midway have filed for corporate
reorganization. Midway Airlines Files for Bankruptcy Protection, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 27, 1991,
at B.
104. See Linda Greenhouse, The Media Business: Linking of 2 Detroit Papers Upheld by Court
in Tie Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1989, at DI (discussing the Supreme Court's ruling allowing
Detroit's two daily newspapers to merge).
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engender an unnatural duopoly. If the two firms were losing only $5 or
$10 million a year, a subsidy of that size to maintain them both as viable
competitors could have been cost justified if it would have ensured such
benefits as more competitive advertising and newspaper prices, greater
employee retention, and a more competitive marketplace for ideas.10 5
Again, the comparison with the observable second-sourcing practice
of private downstream firms is compelling. If all the consumers of the
Detroit newspapers (including advertisers) took the form of a single
buyer, it is not difficult to imagine that this hypothetical monopsonist
would be willing to pay a $10 million subsidy to keep a second source of
supply. It can be in consumers' interest to subsidize failing firms if the
continued presence of these firms would significantly constrain
supracompetitive pricing.
C. The Disparate Treatment of Broadcast and Print Media
While this Article has focused on regulatory strategies to constrain
supracompetitive pricing, 1 6 partial-industry interventions could also
enhance other aspects of an industry's performance. The current regula-
tory structure for the marketplace of ideas in the United States offers a
striking example of partial-industry regulation in other contexts.107 In
two seminal cases 0' the United States Supreme Court established that
the government may regulate the broadcast media in ways that would be
unconstitutional if applied to the print media. Specifically, these cases
allowed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to impose
"equal time" regulations on radio and television broadcasters and struck
down the application of such regulations on newspapers.10 9 The
Supreme Court based its disparate treatment on its perception of the dif-
ferent technological capacities for multiple speech. The Court felt that
105. Since 1969 Sweden has undertaken such selective intervention strategies with continuing
multimillion-dollar subsidies of newspapers to counteract further concentration of ownership and to
facilitate the establishment of additional newspapers. See Robert Taylor, Birthday Party Answers
Critics--Social Democracy Rules the Political System, but Less Comfortably, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2,
1989, at 35 (state subsidies ensure survival of pluralistic media in Sweden).
106. See supra notes 12-51 and accompanying text (discussing strategies designed to achieve
competitive pricing).
107. Ian Ayres, Halfway Home" On Powe's American Broadcasting and the First Amendment,
13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 413, 414-19 (1988) (book review) (discussing theories of broadcast
regulation and their costs).
108. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-401 (1969) (finding FCC's
imposition of a "fairness doctrine" on broadcasters consistent with the First Amendment) with
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that the First
Amendment prohibits "fairness doctrine"-type regulation of the press).
109. An example of one specific type of equal-time regulation that is commonly referred to as
the "fairness doctrine" requires "that discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations,
and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage." Red Lion Broadcasting, 359 U.S. at
369.
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the limited capacity of the broadcast media could justify regulations that
would prevent these scarce sources from being dominated by one view-
point. However, similar regulations would not be appropriate for the
print media because a vast number of speakers can communicate in print,
so that this form of media is not susceptible to the kinds of domination
that could cause the broadcast media to require regulation.
Many commentators have attacked the disparate Supreme Court
treatment of these two main branches of the mass media. The Court's
scarcity distinction has been roundly criticized by academics who have
shown, for example, that the lack of economic opportunities for multiple
newspapers in small towns can make the print media an even more diffi-
cult environment for multiple voices. Some commentators, perceiving no
significant difference between the two types of media, have argued for
industry-wide regulation; 110 others, perceiving no difference, have argued
for laissez-faire policies.I 1I
Lee Bollinger, however, has proposed an innovative theory that
offers a positive justification for disparate treatment of print and broad-
cast media. While acknowledging that these two forms of media are sim-
ilar, he nonetheless suggested that adopting a strategy of partial-industry
regulation differentiating between the medias could be advantageous. 1 2
In an article (which is suggestively subtitled Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media) Bollinger presented the provocative the-
ory that "the very similarity of the two major branches of the mass media
provides a rationale for treating them differently." ' Lucas Powe sum-
marized Bollinger's thesis:
The separation of broadcasting from print provides the nation with "the
best of two worlds": "access in a highly concentrated press and minimal
government intervention." Access and balance are important goals, but
governmental regulation always brings with it the risks of censorship,
either private or public. The fact that print is unrestrained, however,
provides a check on those risks: information not disseminated by broad-
casters will be available in newspapers, and the very existence of an
unregulated press will provide a competitive spur to offset any tendency
of broadcasters to be excessively timid. 14
110. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press--A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1641 (1967) (finding distinction between press and media dubious and calling for regulation
of access to the press).
111. See, eg., LucAs A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 248-56 (1987) (arguing that First Amendment doctrine accommodates freedom from
government regulation for both broadcast and press media).
112. Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976).
113. Id. at 36.
114. POWE, supra note ill, at 5 (quoting Bollinger, supra note 112, at 27, 36 (footnotes
omitted)); see also Ayres, supra note 107, at 416 (noting Powe's agreement with Bollinger's thesis
that the two forms of media have no relevant constitutional distinction).
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Bollinger's apology for the disparate treatment of print and broad-
cast speech is strikingly similar to this Article's preceding arguments for
partial-industry regulation. His theory is a form of dominant-firm inter-
vention that leaves the competitive fringe unregulated. The regulated
and unregulated portions of an industry can create a system of mutual
checks and balances. When this strategy is applied in the marketplace-
of-ideas context, both the government-regulated portion and the laissez-
faire portion check each other for potential abuses, providing a competi-
tive backstop for a society that does not know which mechanism for mar-
ket organization (public or private) to trust.
D. Dominant-Firm Regulation of Long-Distance Telephone Service
The success of dominant-firm intervention in the United States long-
distance telephone industry argues for considering its application in
other regulatory settings. Dominant-firm regulation currently governs
the United States long-distance telephone industry. Under the present
regulatory regime, only the dominant firm, AT&T, must submit its rates
to the FCC for approval.115 Fringe long-distance firms, such as MCI and
Sprint, are not subject to minimum-price rules." 6 As illustrated
above, 1" the maximum-price rules regulating AT&T constrain all firms
within the industry from engaging in supracompetitive pricing.
In addition the minimum-price aspects of rate regulation also
restrain the dominant firm from price cutting aimed at excluding its new
competitors from the market. Moreover, partial-industry regulation can
achieve both these goals without forgoing the price-cutting fringe's disci-
plining effects on the dominant firm. The competitive influence of fringe
firms in the long-distance telephone industry was vividly illustrated one
month after MCI announced plans for nationwide long-distance service
in selected cities, when AT&T sought permission to lower its long-dis-
tance rates in many of those cities.11 '
115. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Authorizations Therefor: First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 22-24 (1980)
(detailing and justifying restraints on AT&T). For a discussion of the FCC proceedings, see MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
116. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Authorizations Therefor: Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 578-79 (1983)
(granting GTE Sprint an exception from regulations).
117. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing effect of dominant-firm price
constraints on fringe-firm pricing).
118. See Sydney Shaw, AT&T Asks FCC for Deregulation, UPI, Apr. 2, 1984, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (AT&T's request for deregulation in the long-distance telephone
industry to allow it to compete with its rivals and offer lower prices).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that partial-industry intervention is poten-
tially superior to both industry-wide regulation and laissez-faire policies.
While partial-industry regulation can take a wide variety of forms, this
Article discussed three types of intervention strategy. First, "dominant-
firm" strategies seek to restrain the anticompetitive behavior of dominant
firms while leaving fringe firms unregulated. Second, "fringe-firm" strat-
egies seek to promote or preserve the existence of fringe firms but allow
the structurally improved market to set its own price. Finally, "oligop-
oly tournament" strategies seek to reward firms for their relative per-
formance, as with patent races and yardstick competition.
These strategies might be used separately or in conjunction with
each other to enhance the competitive environm6nt of an industry. For
example, a partial-industry regulation bailing out People Express could
have employed two strategies: conditioning the subsidy on sustaining
People as a price cutter is a typical fringe-firm strategy, but the con-
straining influence of this condition on the larger firms also resembles a
dominant-firm price restraint. One could also hypothesize a scenario
employing all three strategies: (1) dominant firms must submit their
prices for approval, (2) a fringe firm gets a tax break for research-and-
development expenditure, and (3) this tax break is targeted to the fringe
firm with the best record of developing innovations that open new export
markets. Dominant- and fringe-firm intervention can also apply dispa-
rate regulatory processes to firms within an industry to encourage them
to investigate, promulgate, and enforce regulatory standards. For exam-
ple, regulators could mandate that dominant firms undertake special pro-
grams of self-regulation.119
Partial-industry regulations can also empower third parties to par-
ticipate in the regulatory process. An incipient form of this latter, tripar-
tite intervention strategy has been adopted in the British
telecommunication industry-individual firms have been required by
their national governments to consult with Consumer Councils. 120 An
approximation to fringe-firm strategies, tripartite intervention has also
occurred with nursing-home regulation. Consumers have little market
119. Dominant-firm intervention might also take the form of what we have called "enforced
self-regulation." See AYRES & BRArrHwArrE, supra note 6. Enforced self-regulation consists of
regulatory requirements for firms to promulgate self-regulating rules and for government to verify
that these rules are adequate and enforced. Under such a scheme a dominant-firm intervention
version of enforced self-regulation would require the dominant firm to write rules to restrain
monopoly abuse, and these rules would then be publicly approved. The dominant firm would be
required to establish its own internal enforcement mechanisms to sustain compliance with those
rules; this self-enforcement would be reinforced by public enforcement of the privately written rules.
120. See, eg., Mary Fagan, BT Tariffs 'Penalise Poorest,' INDEPENDENT, Feb. 18, 1991, at 6
(reporting the National Consumer Council's demand of an overhaul of British Telecom's pricing
system).
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power in that industry; they are mostly too frail to "vote with their feet"
by leaving the nursing home. An alternative method of securing con-
sumer sovereignty and influence over the industry utilizes a fringe-firm,
tripartite intervention strategy that encourages consumer participation
on Residents' and Relatives' Councils. The way regulators have histori-
cally sought to achieve this goal in Australia and the United States has
been to encourage fringe firms to innovate by adopting such consumer
participation groups. The state of Michigan, for example, paid bonus
Medicaid rates to nursing homes that established effective Residents'
Councils.' 2 ' The more immediate result of this strategy in both countries
was the establishment of Residents' Councils within fringe firms as an
emblem of high standards. The larger nursing-home chains then decided
that they too wanted this reputational emblem worn by the fringe inno-
vators. Now nursing homes lacking a Residents' Council are regarded as
having low standards.'22
Our proposal that partial-industry regulation be studied as a plausi-
ble regulatory alternative draws some support from both sides of the
deregulation debate. For conservatives who are fighting industry-wide
regulation, partial-industry regulation is less interventionist. For social
democrats trying to overcome laissez-faire market failure, it offers a pub-
lic check on private actions. Indeed, the political lines of support for
partial-industry strategies will often be drawn in response to the current
regulatory benchmark. If the benchmark is industry-wide regulation,
conservatives are likely to argue that partial-industry regulation is "mar-
ket compatible." On the other hand, if the benchmark is deregulation,
these same conservatives will characterize partial-industry regulation as
anathema. A similar "shoe on a different foot" phenomenon will likely
apply to the response from the left. We suspect, however, that there are
cases in which consumer groups on the left and industry on the right will
be willing to make a deal, avoiding the worst excesses of both industry-
wide regulation and the anticompetitive abuses of unrestrained laissez-
faire market governance. In some situations, partial-industry regulation
will be superior to either full regulation or laissez faire-and will leave
both sides better off than the status quo.
In this Article we have argued that beneficial partial-industry regu-
lation is plausible. This plausibility is bolstered not only by a handful of
instances in which such regulations are already used'23 but also by the
121. John Braithwaite, Australian National University International Nursing Home Research
(1989) (unpublished field notes, on file with the author) (survey of nursing home practices in 25
states of the United States and in 3 other countries).
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text (discussing currmnt dominant-firm
regulation of news media and long-distance telephone service in the United States and fringe-firm
intervention through newspaper subsidies in Sweden).
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private targeted use of analogous strategies by monopsonists. A govern-
ment interested in acting on behalf of its consumer constituents should
begin the job by studying and at times emulating the practices of these
quintessentially empowered consumers. Our message is that if those con-
sumers with market power protect themselves through strategies such as
second-sourcing, we should consider government second-sourcing on
behalf of less powerful consumers. The behavior of monopsonists can
also provide a limiting principle on such use of government power: in
situations where it would not be efficient for a private monopsonist to
second-source, then the government should not intervene either. More
circumspectly, we have argued that while meeting the monopsony stan-
dard should be a necessary condition to government partial-industry reg-
ulation, it is not a sufficient condition for such intervention.
Although we have maintained that partial-industry regulation
imposes lower information demands on government regulators than does
industry-wide price regulation,124 the informational requirements of any
form of economic regulation are considerable enough to caution against
most bureaucratic participation. Hence, we would not counsel even the
mere consideration of partial-industry regulation for run-of-the-mill
commodities. It should be considered only in markets that are so funda-
mental to the infrastructure of the economy-such as the energy, trans-
portation, and telecommunications industries-as to justify concerted
study of the risks and information costs of regulatory intervention.
Moreover, there are special reasons to contemplate partial-industry regu-
latory strategies with the media: the economic significance of the media
is compounded by its importance to democratic freedoms in averting
monopolization of the markets for ideas and news.
The history of economic thought since Keynes has seen a period of
emphasis on the need for government correction of market failure fol-
lowed by a period of emphasis on government's failure in its efforts to
correct market failures. Public-choice theorists, for example, have
argued that government intervention can produce outcomes worse than
failed markets. Today the economic-policy debate proceeds as a battle
between those on the left who want government regulation to correct
market failures and those on the right who think that incompetence,
agency capture, and corruption make government ill-equipped for indus-
try regulation.
In terms of our analysis this is a debate between those who favor
regulatory "shotguns" and those who advocate no guns at all. We con-
tend that by selecting the proper regulatory rifle, it is theoretically possi-
ble to restrain the private exploitation of monopoly power without
substituting the public exploitation of capture and bureaucratic empire
124. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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building. Partial-industry regulation uses public regulation as a check on
private monopoly power and private competition as a balance against
regulatory capture and error. Government is restrained from acting as a
cartel ringleader by the competitive forces of the unregulated firms com-
peting with those that are regulated. If the government errs in control-
ling the price or facilitating the survival of the regulated firm, the error
may not be fatal to the entire industry because it will not affect the unreg-
ulated firms in the market.
The insight of the partial-regulation idea is that it does not require a
choice between siding with the regulators or the deregulators. Creative
policy design can incorporate both approaches, utilizing the strengths of
each strategy as a safeguard against the weaknesses of the other.
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